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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE IN THE SOVIET UNION—
THE LIMITS OF REFORM

SEPTEMBER 15, 1988

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PUBLIC HEARING ON THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE IN THE SOVIET UNION—THE LIMITS OF REFORM?

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1988

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 628, of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 10 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman, and Senator Dennis DeConcini, Cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners, Representative John Porter and Hon. Ronald Lehman from the Department of Defense.

Also in attendance: Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel; Jane Fisher, senior staff consultant; and Mike Amitay, hearing coordinator.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman HOYER. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I want to call this hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to order.

We are here to hear testimony from four very prominent, and very committed individuals who can speak personally to the nationalities issue confronting the Soviet Government.

Their views have been sought by the Commission as we attempt to form a clear picture of developments in the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev regarding nationalities.

These developments will provide us with a window through which the contours of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, as well as democratizatsiya can be viewed.

No multi-ethnic society, indeed including the United States, has a perfect record in coping with the diverse interests, with the expectations, and with the demands of various population groups.

But all 35 signatories to the Final Act undertook a solemn moral commitment to safeguard the rights of national minorities.

Integral to the nationalities issue is the question of religious and cultural freedom, the right to practice one's faith, the free flow of information about the past of nationalities; preservation of churches, cultural monuments and other artifacts of minority cultures, and the right to use native languages.

The nationalities issue is quite simply a human rights issue. As the Soviet Government grapples with its history so as to come to grips with its present, nationalities issues are paramount.

Our hearing today maps out some of the major problem areas for Soviet nationalities. The Commission began this examination last year, with a hearing on human rights on the Baltic States.

Because of the complexity of the issue and the number of nationalities in the Soviet Union, time constraints limit our examination today. For example, we do not have a witness on Soviet Jewry or on the Crimean Tatars.

Perhaps in the near future we will be able to continue our examination of other aspects of this problem, with its increasingly significant political dimensions.

I would like to introduce our four witnesses, each of whom brings a unique perspective on the nationality issues. Three have served long prison terms in the gulag in reprisal for their nationalist activities.

One was the first Soviet to be deprived of his citizenship while abroad. Dr. Valery Chalidze was a MacArthur Award-winning physicist, and publisher.

He came into the United States in 1972. Three weeks after arriving, in an unprecedented move, he was stripped of his Soviet citizenship.

Dr. Chalidze will provide us with an overview of the nationalities issue, including Russian nationalism in the context of Gorbachev's reform program.

Mr. Airikyan is an Armenian nationalist who has spent 17 years in Soviet prison camps and internal exile. In March of this year he was arrested for publicizing the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and became a rallying point for Armenian protesters.

As a result of his activities he was forcibly expelled this past July from the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian human rights activist, Petro Ruban, is a 22-year veteran of the Soviet gulag, including a camp term in reprisal for a wooden Statue of Liberty he carved to honor the American Bicentennial.

In May he was released from the notorious Perm Camp No. 35 and arrived in the United States in July.

And finally, this morning we will hear from Dr. Statkevicius, a psychiatrist and a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Monitoring Group.

He has spent a total of 11 years in Soviet camps, prisons, and psychiatric hospitals. He arrived in the United States in May.

On behalf of the Commission I want to thank all four of the witnesses for taking time to be with us and for sharing with us their own personal experiences, observations and analyses.

I would at this time like to introduce, for such opening remarks as he would like to make, my distinguished Cochairman, the senior Senator from Arizona, Dennis DeConcini.

STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN DeCONCINI

Cochairman DECONCINI. Chairman Hoyer, thank you very much. I would like to thank everyone for coming today. We welcome our distinguished guests to be with us.

Today we focus on a very important aspect of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform drive—one which threatens his very existence as a leader of the Soviet Union.

The nationalities issue thrusts a longstanding emotional dilemma into the forefront as Gorbachev struggles to find a balance between greater openness and the limits his reform can be put to.

The hundreds of thousands of protesters who first gathered in the squares of Yerevan and invoked the name of the General Secretary, now condemn him for not doing more to help them achieve their goals.

It is apparent that their definition of restructuring differs from the one being crafted by the Kremlin leadership.

We hope our witnesses today will give us their views about this critical point—what do *glasnost* and *perestroika* mean to an Armenian, a Ukrainian, or a Balt?

How far can Gorbachev go to meet this definition and still retain control of his reform movement? There are limits to Gorbachev's ability and willingness to address nationalities issues.

The Soviet Union is an empire comprising over 100 different ethnic and national minorities, each with a proud heritage and identity. Many of these groups have seen this heritage stifled by Russian expansion.

As we have seen in Armenia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and the Muslim Republics, the resentment smoldering in this lingering nationalism needs only a spark to ignite centuries of mistrust that have been going on.

Prior to Gorbachev's leadership, protests with nationalist overtones were not as widespread, and none matched the scale of those taking place today.

Even 3 years ago, it would be difficult to imagine even the limited tolerance we are seeing now towards nationalist demonstrations. Gorbachev has placed himself in a difficult position with regard to nationality issues.

Gorbachev and his reformers are still in a delicate power struggle and it seems that they can ill afford to foster national divisiveness of the sort that led to rioting in Sumgait, armed intervention in Armenia and Azerbaijan earlier this year.

It is important that the United States monitor the situation carefully. It is also important that we continue to hold the Soviets to their commitment under the Helsinki Final Act to respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and "afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . ."

The nationality situation is a potentially explosive one—one which might derail Gorbachev's reforms and Gorbachev himself.

Our witnesses today will lend unique, firsthand views of this drama that is unfolding daily in the Soviet Union and the dilemma it poses.

I am looking forward, Mr. Chairman, to their testimony today.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

I'd also like to introduce to our witnesses and to our audience one of the newest members of the Commission, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Ambassador Ron Lehman.

Mr. Ambassador, we're glad to have you with us, and thank you for joining us today.

At this time I would like to introduce the interpreters. First of all, of our staff, one of our senior staff members, Catherine Cosman, who will be interpreting for Mr. Airikyan.

Christina Isajiw of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians will be interpreting for Mr. Ruban.

Margarita Samatas from the Lithuanian Information Service, will be interpreting for Dr. Statkevicius.

At this time I would like to introduce Dr. Chalidze who will start off.

STATEMENT OF MR. VALERY CHALIDZE, A MacARTHUR AWARD-WINNING PHYSICIST AND PUBLISHER

Mr. CHALIDZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to make a little correction. I'm sorry that I look so distinguished that everybody call me Doctor. But I am not doctor. Just mister.

Chairman HOYER. Well, that may be more distinguished. That's sort of like being a lawyer. Being a nonlawyer many times, is much more distinguished.

[Laughter.]

Mr. CHALIDZE. For a long time Soviet propaganda has stated that the question of nationality in U.S.S.R. has been finally solved. No one has made a serious attempt, however, to explain seriously what this senseless statement can mean.

Most likely it was an attempt to ignore the most pointed contradictions in a country populated by more than 100 nationalities; and, at the same time, an attempt to forbid discussion on these problems.

Western experts have long known about nationality conflict in the U.S.S.R., and for many of them this knowledge was the source of hope for the potential destabilization of the Soviet Union.

This hope has not materialized, however, over the course of 70 years, which itself shows that Soviet leaders can rule the country without even analyzing existing problems.

I cannot develop that thought fully at present, but it is useful to remember it.

It is quite possible to expect that any attempt to democratize the country would bring some sort of destabilization and national uprising, including separatist movements.

Separatism, by the way, is far from being the main problem with nationality relations in U.S.S.R. It is clear that all, or a majority of nationalists in the U.S.S.R. will remain a part of the Soviet Union indefinitely.

The majority of the people of non-Russian nationalities has not even considered the possibility of separation from the Soviet Union.

I believe these people do want, though, free development of their national culture, and protection of their national uniqueness from unification. They also want to have a voice in their solutions to their own problems.

I will just mention, because of shortage of time, a few main problems which nationalities in Russia face.

First of all is a lack of political autonomy, real political autonomy, and massive persecution of almost all nationalities, including falsification of their history in order to show that they voluntarily joined Russia in the course of history, regardless of the fact that some of them were conquered by Russia.

In my written testimony I gave a longer list of these problems. I'll just continue to mention a few.

One of the important things in national areas of the Soviet Union, especially in the Asian Republics, including Transcaucasian, is corruption. Corrupt bosses in Moscow, together with local, what they call feudal Mafia, bring much more suffering in the particular area.

The ecological situation in U.S.S.R., generally speaking, is very close to critical. But this shouldn't be an excuse to disregard ecology in national regions. The Russian Government must have a special responsibility to keep ecological security in national regions because Moscow does not allow national regions to plan their own economies. Such plans usually come from Moscow, and these economical plans are known to disregard national ecological security. The most well-known examples of this are the disappearance of Aral Sea, the dehydration of Aral Sea.

Poisoning of the population and the soil in Uzbekistan and Moldavia by pesticides is another example. The critical poisoning of air in Armenia, which has reached very dangerous levels, by the way, is another.

The salination of the soil in middle Asia is yet another instance of ecological crimes against these nations.

By the way, the Chernobyl catastrophe in the Ukraine brings another problem, because many in the Ukraine worry about possible catastrophes in atomic stations now. And there's also public worrying about an atomic station in a seismically dangerous area in Armenia.

We know that according to the human rights covenants, which was ratified by the Soviet Union, no nation, no people, must be deprived of its means of existence. Taking the land from the people definitely would be a violation of this principle.

We know that even now some people, like Crimean Tatars, Meskhs, and Volga Germans are deprived of their land which they lost during the Stalin era.

In addition, because of the ecological crisis, Karakalpaks in middle Asia, and nationalities of the north can lose their land because of the ecological situation and they would have to be removed from this historical area.

There is a lot of contradictions connected with artificial borders between Republics in the Soviet Union. The most well-known problem is Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan which is populated by a majority of Armenians.

But sooner or later, we will hear about many more areas of this kind, especially in middle Asia.

This presents very important problems for those nations and for the Soviet Government.

Usually when you talk about nationality problems, it's between a national minority and the Russian majority, but there are enough

problems between nation minorities, like we know now with the Nagorno-Karabakh with the Azerbaijan Armenians.

We know of conflicts between Georgians and Apals, conflicts in the Yakutia and Aral. This area, by the way, is not very well documented, but we hear about a lot of such conflicts there.

To the artificiality of borders——

[Buzzer sounding.]

Is it for me?

Chairman HOYER. No, no.

Mr. CHALIDZE. Did I use up my time?

Chairman HOYER. No. That's the Senator's time.

Mr. CHALIDZE. As to the artificiality of borders between republics, I can give another example of the area of Saingilo in Azerbaijan, populated mostly by Georgians. And there were a lot of complaints about that area, too.

Native religion, for many nationalities in the Soviet Union, plays the role of a spiritual refuge from their situation with being deprived of national rights, and political autonomy.

So the usual Soviet partyism in national areas, sometime takes the character of an anti-national policy, because struggling against religion becomes struggling against nationality rights altogether, as is well known, especially in western Ukraine and Lithuania.

I want to point also, that Soviet authority often exhibits a type of cultural imperialism over national minorities, assuming that the traditional ways of life of minorities are not civilized enough. As a result the national minorities are forced to change their way of life.

This mostly affected Siberian nationalities and nationalities of the north, which sometimes completely forgot their traditional way of life, with a resulting spread of occultism and loss of national identity.

In conclusion of this short statement about a general view on the problem, I want to say that the imperial character of the Russian authorities is not the only source of all these problems. Before the revolution there were many nationality problems in Russia. There were national and religious inequalities.

The Russian Empire, as a rule, however, did not destroy the traditional ways of life of the minorities, and often respected the traditions and extended even more autonomy to minorities which are now characterized as all propaganda.

After the revolution, the new authorities pretended to follow Marxism, although very soon, only the phraseology remained of the Marxism. The anti-national character of Marxism, however, remains in this regime.

This is why, not only the national minorities, but also the Russian culture and tradition suffer. Although the Russians are the dominant nation in this empire, their situation also is not enviable.

The minorities that are persecuted by the Russians can seek spiritual refuge in their tradition, history, and culture. Russians do not have refuge, however, from this old regime which persecutes the Russian traditions and culture as well.

Therefore, I have some hope when I see the awakening of Russian national sentiment among some portion of the Russian intelligentsia. By this I mean movements in defense of the Russian

nature, architecture and religion, and for truth in the telling of Russian history.

We hear that these movements have there own extremists such as the anti-Semitic society Pamiat. One should not judge, however, an entire movement by its extremists.

Maybe it will be easier for Russians to respect the culture of national minorities if they will learn to preserve their own culture.

I apologize for my morning English, which is especially bad in the morning.

[Laughter.]

Chairman HOYER. Well, it's much better than my afternoon Russian, I want to tell you that.

Mr. Chalidze, we thank you for those comments and for a very interesting conclusion.

Now I'd like to recognize Mr. Airikyan. And interpreting for him will be, as I said earlier, a member of our staff, Cathy Cosman.

STATEMENT OF MR. PARUIR AIRIKYAN, AN ARMENIAN NATIONALIST

(Note, unless otherwise specified, all answers and statements made by Mr. Airikyan are given through the translator, Catherine Cosman.)

Mr. AIRIKYAN. Thank you very much for inviting me here. In order to save time I've asked Ms. Cosman to read my statement in English.

This discussion of nationality issues is based on my long experience as a member of the National Unity Party, founded in 1966 in Yerevan.

It was an underground national independence organization. Since 1974 it has tried to attain legal status and the holding of a referendum on independence for Armenia. Over the years, 100 of its members have been imprisoned.

Last year, on the basis of this organization, a new public grassroots organization, the Union for National Self-Determination, more appropriate for *glasnost* and *perestroika*, was formed. This new organization was founded with the knowledge of the Supreme Soviet.

For this new organization the main principle—not just the aim—is national self-determination. Despite our skepticism towards democracy in a one-party system, we were ready to assist the development of these new trends.

But the events of the past few months, particularly the attitude of the central authorities to the Karabakh problem—when the democratic expression of the popular will was ignored—showed that Moscow is neither ready for change nor for democracy.

Nevertheless, we think that self-determination is the basic principle for resolving nationality issues.

In democratic societies, nationality crises cannot arise because the ethnic group as a whole, having political rights, also has collective rights to determine its future.

In such cases, only extremist acts can lead to crises. And in response to such extremist-terrorist acts, extreme reaction by society is needed in order to defend its rights.

In contrast, the basic principle of Communist rule from Lenin to Gorbachev is only to maintain Communists in power. Therefore, the Kremlin lives in terror of any new democratic movements.

Anything which is not sanctioned by Moscow—even if it is in its interest—is feared as a threat of popular initiative. And that is why the Kremlin reacted so cruelly to Karabakh, and particularly Sumgait.

The Karabakh phenomena could have been good for Gorbachev, in that it showed the democratic potential of the Soviet system. But Gorbachev did not react to this phenomenon in a positive way. Gorbachev did not think the Karabakh precedent was desirable because it showed how change could be induced from below.

Therefore, the popular demand in Nagorno-Karabakh to be joined to Armenia had to be punished. At least Gorbachev felt he had to refuse this demand so that it did not serve as a model for other nationalities for their own independent initiatives.

Glasnost, without liberalization of the laws, can only lead to more crises. There is now a law on the books which requires public examination of important new laws. This current law, however, does not give people the right to a decisive voice.

In addition, there is now no law on referendums, although a draft law on this important issue has existed since 1980. Such a law is particularly important in a one-party system.

What are the future perspectives for the nationality problem in the Soviet Union today? The Soviet Union is now at a crossroads. It can move forward towards a society of laws, by adopting laws which guarantee popular self-expression.

In the worst case, the Soviet leadership might revert to its old principles and return to Stalinism.

In Armenia, our organization, the Union for National Self-Determination, has decided not to wait until Moscow becomes democratic. Rather, our actions are based on international standards such as the Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.

In this way, we have chosen democracy and we hope to assist the development of democracy throughout the Soviet Union.

From the point of view of our organization, the principle of free choice is always more important than the political programs of any segment of the Armenian population—not to speak of Moscow's. Let people make their choice.

It seems to me, that nationality rights do not differ from those of the individual. The rights of the nation are violated when a human rights violation occurs.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Airikyan, for an excellent statement.

We look forward to getting back to you with questions. We will be getting back with questions to all of our witnesses.

Next, Mr. Ruban.

STATEMENT OF MR. PETRO RUBAN, A UKRAINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST WHO WAS ARRESTED FOR PUBLICIZING THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CRISIS

(Note: unless otherwise noted, all answers and statements made by Mr. Ruban are given through the translator, Christina Isajiw.)

Mr. RUBAN. (Speaking for himself) Ladies and gentlemen——

The TRANSLATOR. Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here and, to save time, I'm asking my interpreter to read my statement.

It is my pleasure and privilege to be a witness before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I am fully aware that my responsibility here is enormous, for I am impelled to testify not only on behalf of those who still remain in the concentration camps and those living in the so-called freedom of the Soviet system, but also in memory of those who perished in their struggle with the regime—the Ukrainians who died praying to God to grant freedom to their nation.

I would like to recognize the tremendous efforts of the members of this Commission on my behalf and on the behalf of my son, Mark.

I thank the Chairman of the Commission, Congressman Steny Hoyer, Cochairman Senator Dennis DeConcini, as well as their staffs. I also extend my gratitude to Ambassador Richard Shifter as well as Ambassador Warren Zimmermann and the Vienna staff for their untiring efforts on behalf of all of us.

With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, humankind has entered into a new era of social relations. Although state interests remain the center of concern, nevertheless, human rights has at last become an important factor of global politics and international relations.

In July 1988, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was created as an outgrowth of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which, as you know, has never formally ceased to exit.

In its Declaration of Principles, the Union reaffirms the principles for human rights as put forth by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group on November 9, 1976—but it goes further. It states that a national democratic movement for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood will provide the most solid base for guaranteeing the economic, social, cultural and political rights of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union began its activities in defense of human rights and national freedom in the new atmosphere of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. However, the difficulties facing a true restructuring of Soviet society are not just due to the inertia of the masses—cowered by many years of terror.

The fact is that the major opponents of any real change are the Soviet politically-cohesive forces currently on the offensive. They are now focusing on Ukraine—the fiefdom of Brezhnev's old crony Shcherbytsky, First Party Secretary of Ukraine. And Gorbachev continues to keep him there, for whether or not the restructuring succeeds, the Soviet Empire must remain intact.

This is the general line of the party on the national question. Because of its size and location, Ukraine is of crucial importance to the central authorities of the Soviet Union.

Although not well publicized in the West, the past year has seen numerous gatherings in Ukraine. Since the limitations of time prevent me from describing them to you, a chronological list of meetings, numbers attending, and issues discussed has been provided for you. I would like to highlight but a few of them:

May 29 to June 5: the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church organized High Masses near Lvov, in Western Ukraine, where 2,000 people gathered.

June 5: the Culturological Club organized an unofficial Millennium of Christianity celebration in Kiev, by 200 people, with readings of excerpts from Pope John Paul's Homilies, and called for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

June 16: 8,000 people gathered in Lvov at a meeting organized by the "Ridna Mova" Society. The meeting turned into a debate about the selection of delegates to the 19th Party Conference, the continuing policies of russification, a calling for an end to party and KGB privileges, and for the Soviet Republics to be given full autonomy.

June 19: there was another unofficial millennium celebration held by 300 people in the city of Kharkov, in Ukraine, organized by the unofficial "Vasyl Stus Friends of Ukrainian Language." The militia attempted to breakup the gathering and demanded that it be conducted in Russian, not Ukrainian. It's organizer was threatened with deportation to Chernobyl.

July 7: 20,000 demonstrated in Lvov and this was scheduled to have become a regular monthly meeting of the Democratic Front to Further *Perestroika*.

July 17: 15,000 Catholics gathered in Zarvanytsia, Ternopil. This is a region of traditional pilgrimages. The militia tried to turn back pilgrims, some of whom came from up to 1,000 kilometers away, but they continued on foot and setup camps around the traditional pilgrimage site. Underground Bishop Vasylyk delivered the sermon. Over 4,000 people received Communion and over 30,000 signatures were collected on a petition calling for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The list goes on but, by far, the most significant event took place on June 11-12 when the Ukrainian Democratic Front united with Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Georgian national rights representatives to form a Coordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements of the People of the U.S.S.R.

The Armenians, fully supporting these objectives, were unable to attend. This Coordinating Committee is calling for a complete political and economic decentralization of the U.S.S.R., which they envisaged as a future confederation of separate sovereign states. A text is appended for your information; that is, the Principles of Declaration.

The Ukrainian national-democratic movement is a peaceful action within the framework of *glasnost*. However, the campaign of slander against the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian Herald (a publication and the Culturological Club in Kiev) is growing.

The authorities have even begun to spread rumors that the Culturological Club and "Ukrainian nationalists," are preparing pogroms against Jews.

In response, Ukrainian and Jewish activists have cooperated in preparing statements protesting this slander. A massive campaign of repression against those active in the national-democratic movement was put into effect in July of this year.

Thousands (in one case, 50,000 citizens) participated in meetings and demonstrations in Lvov in June and July. The authorities engaged the 6th Special Regimen Militia Company, the courts, the KGB and trained dogs against these citizens.

The state's response to the spontaneous growth of civic activism consisted of arrests, 15-day detentions, compulsory labor, and initiation of criminal cases against participants.

A criminal case has been prepared against Ivan Makar, an activist from Lvov, who was arrested August 4, and charged with article 190-3—the first case of its kind during the period of restructuring. By arresting him, the regime is testing the West's resolve to defend human rights.

What about the future? Workers, peasants, and government officials—all are skeptical about the new promises of the party.

There is a basis for this distrust and it is provided by Gorbachev himself for he is clearly maneuvering, engaging in disinformation, and contradicting himself. The most contradictory element is Gorbachev's nationality policy.

Among the measures which could be taken if the Helsinki Accords were truly observed in Ukraine would be the recognition and restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and also the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church together with the return of its confiscated property and the recognition that its forced liquidation in 1946 was a crime.

How will relations between the West and the Soviet Union develop? Will the West support the individuals and their efforts to become true masters of their fate, support the national yearnings of the peoples of the last empire in the world?

As a member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, I ask American legislators to take into consideration the fact that the nationalities problem of the Republics in the U.S.S.R. is one of the most serious problems in today's world.

The force and timing of Western pressure on the Soviet leaders to exact a certain level of performance on human rights issues is crucial at present.

Ukraine and its nationalities issue is central to the Soviet Union both economically and politically. That is why Moscow uses special force to crush its national democratic movement, for if Moscow loses control of Ukraine the decentralization process is inevitable.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

Last, we are pleased to hear from Dr. Statkevicius. And his interpreter is Margarita Samatas.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALGIRDAS STATKEVICIUS, A PSYCHIATRIST AND A MEMBER OF THE LITHUANIAN HELSINKI MONITORING GROUP

(Note: unless otherwise noted, all questions and statements made by Dr. Statkevicius are given through the translator, Margarita Samatas.)

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. Ladies and gentlemen, first I do want to thank you and the representatives of the U.S. Government for allowing me to testify and to be here. And I would like Margarita Samatas to read my translation.

As a result of the Hitler-Stalin conspiracy, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, and it's secret protocols, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians lost their sovereignty and national independence.

In 1951, because of my activities in defense of human and national rights I was sentenced by a military tribunal to 25 years of imprisonment in a concentration camp, and to 5 years of exile.

In all Siberian concentration camps, wherever I was held, everywhere I found that Lithuanians represented 10 percent of the prisoners.

For being active in the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, I was kept in the special psychiatric hospitals of Chernyakhovsk and Tashkent, together with murderers, bandits, thieves, and other very dangerous criminals, for almost 7 years, from 1980 to 1987.

Through all those years, neither I, nor my wife, nor my children were permitted to learn the details of the Supreme Court verdict that would explain why I was declared to be a "socially dangerous person."

I am a qualified physician, psychiatrist. The treatment of the inmates in the special psychiatric hospitals, both in Chernyakhovsk and Tashkent were merciless. There were many people who hanged themselves, not being able to endure the overwhelming pain brought on by the injections of drugs.

Among the inmates who were in prison for political activities, either in Chernyakhovsk and Tashkent, I never encountered a single individual who could be regarded as psychically ill, or psychologically ill, or could be judged as even minutely as being socially dangerous.

Although psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union has decreased, the case of three Lithuanians presently held incommunicado in the notorious Serbsky Forensic Examination Institute in Moscow, indicates clearly that the problem is still there.

The oppressed Baltic Republics are being forced to absorb gigantic construction projects. This is a cover for a planned colonialization.

Only last week an atomic plant in Ignalina, identical to the powerplant in Chernobyl, had to be closed down for safety reasons. The Baltic States are actively opposing russification and colonialization.

For example, during the spring of 1988, a large demonstration took place in Latvia to oppose construction of the underground metro rail line in Riga which would bear the influx of tens of thousands of new colonists into Latvia.

The Soviet Union has legalized not merely a class system of apartheid, but also a national one. For example, the Russians are permitted to have Russian schools in all Baltic Republics, but Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians are drastically forbidden to have their own language schools in the Russian Republic.

In the Soviet Union this is referred to as "national equality and national brotherhood."

As a result of state sponsored practices of using slave labor based policies, the economy of the country is constantly in a state of crisis. As a consequence of this, agriculture in the Baltic States has acquired a colonial character.

Forty percent of those employed receive wages that are less than 100 rubles monthly.

In the Soviet Union *perestroika* is widely admired. However, representatives of religious faiths continue to be barred from establishing religious-social organizations that can make contributions to morality and at the same time, to raising the cultural level of the masses.

There is widespread discrimination against believers. Churches are desecrated. They are turned into museums of atheism, concert halls, et cetera. People from all the Baltic States who are completely innocent, who fought against Stalinism, who merely strive for freedom for their own and other nations, are being held behind bars in areas of exile.

The youth of the oppressed nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is being forced, by the use of drastic measures, to swear military oaths to the occupiers and be taken to Afghanistan to kill Afghan sons and daughters fighting a battle for their freedom. All of this is a violation of international law.

Without any serious justification, freedom of movement is being restricted. Relatives and families experience obstacles in being reunited. Former active fighters against Stalin are not permitted to travel abroad.

It is only in the last few months strong public pressure, and the massive demonstrations in the Baltic States has forced the Soviet Union to admit that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement existed.

The three oppressed and struggling Baltic nations, engaged in an unending fight for freedom and survival, are the greatest bleeding wounds left by World War II that will not heal. The only hope for healing this wound is to use the methods as outlined in the Helsinki Agreement to end the Soviet colonial rule, and thereby obtain an honorable world peace.

In concluding, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the members of this Commission and other officials of the U.S. Government for the concern and efforts on my behalf during the 7 long years of psychiatric imprisonment.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

Unfortunately Senator DeConcini will have to leave now. He's got another meeting that he must attend.

Again, let me thank all of you for your testimony. We realize that our time is brief, but of course you bring an incredible depth of experience and commitment to these hearings.

Mr. Chalidze, let me start with you, if I might, on some questions.

How would you assess the political risks of the nationality situation in the Soviet Union and how—if you were Gorbachev—would you handle the tensions that are raised by——

Mr. CHALIDZE. A little slowly for me, please.

Chairman HOYER. Yes. More slowly?

Mr. CHALIDZE. Yes. I didn't get it all at once.

Chairman HOYER. All right. My question to you is, first of all, how do you assess the level of risk, how dangerous is the nationality issue——

Mr. CHALIDZE. OK.

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Chairman HOYER. [continuing]. in the Soviet Union? And second, if you were the General Secretary, how would you attempt to respond to the nationalities issue in the Soviet Union?

Mr. CHALIDZE. Well, the political risk is really very big. Gorbachev started with a bold attempt to reform the country. Let's assume he has the best intentions; in 25 years we'd like what he would achieve in Russia.

In this case he is in a very dangerous position because conservative opposition in Russia is very big and it just looks for an excuse to oust him. As one day, as you remember, they did oust Khrushchev for much less of an attempt to reform the country.

So in this sense, any nationality uprising is very dangerous for future democratization of Russia.

I don't think, however, that it is this problem that would be the end of Gorbachev, because more harm can come from workers' uprisings.

The problem is that when Gorbachev started *glasnost* and people started to talk, everyone wants everything at once. Sorry—my English is bad.

Workers want meat and sausage. Workers want a better situation in the workplace. Nationalities want autonomy and recognition. There is a problem for Karabakh, there are problems of autonomy in the Baltic States, and many, many others.

Everyone wants everything at once, and nobody seems to understand that it's impossible to get everything at once. At the same time, if attempts to reform the country over 25 or 50 years are successful, many things will come with them.

But at the same time, I am not in the position to say, be patient. Wait. I know that people will demand what they want. So the situation is rather critical.

If you would ask me what the position of your United States could be—I would recommend to be as patient and as supportive of Gorbachev as possible, because for me, as I understand it, Gorbachev is the best thing that's happened to Russia in the 20th century, and one should give him a chance.

It's slow, definitely it will be with advances and retreats, but it's good in many ways. So it must get a chance. But if everyone will want everything at once, and plus, if the United States will demand that everyone will get everything at once, the situation could be very difficult.

We have to decide what we expect of Gorbachev: to succeed with slow reforms, and only slow reforms can be realistic, or just to flash like a falling star and make a statement that the situation in Russia is bad and they need democracy, and fail after this. We have to choose what we want from Gorbachev.

I think we want gradual improvement of the country, and I think Gorbachev, regardless of all retreats, can deliver gradual improvements, but, unfortunately, many people have to be patient. I don't see any other way.

Did I answer your question?

Chairman HOYER. Yes, I think partially so.

Mr. CHALIDZE. Yes. Second question, What I would do if I would be Gorbachev? I think I would face so many problems that I would

have to go to my colleague here, who is a psychiatrist, and seek help.

[Laughter.]

I wouldn't be able to bear it. It's too difficult. It's too much pressure. You see, sometimes they compare the President of the United States and Gorbachev like the two most powerful men. There's no comparison.

Compared with the job of Gorbachev and the quantity of problems and questions, and quantities of responsibilities—the President of the United States is on vacation, because he doesn't rule the country. There are many separate branches who rule the country and share responsibility. Gorbachev is responsible for everything, especially in light of the Russian bureaucracy that is afraid to make decisions even when it is supposed to make decisions. Bureaucrats go to the top and ask questions.

Chairman HOYER. I thought of a number of observations I could make about the President's vacation but I will not make.

Mr. CHALIDZE. No, no. Whatever I say doesn't touch my deep respect to President Reagan.

Chairman HOYER. I understand that. I was teasing.

Mr. Chalidze, the 19th Party Conference took some actions and made some proposals relating to the treatment of nationalities. Can you comment on those proposals?

Mr. CHALIDZE. I can comment on it as an attempt to cool people down. They really didn't make any drastic decisions because they're not ready to decide complicated problems.

But they want to ease things and show more respect and more attention to nationalities, hoping that things will, for a while, cool off. And it will not be in the way of what they're doing there.

I think for many nationalities which are not as active as the Baltics or Armenians, for example, for many it will bring some cooling off and some temporary help.

But at the same time, separately they try to address the question of the Crimean Tatars, and they didn't do anything, they just tried to disguise the problem. They didn't solve the problem.

Why? I don't know why. Maybe, maybe Gorbachev is oriented against national minorities, but I don't think it's to a large degree. What is possible is that the conservatives in the party are so strong, that he has to be careful with questions he doesn't consider of major importance.

Because for Armenians, Karabakh is the main question and for Gorbachev it definitely is not. So he tries to cool off the situation and keep the conservative bureaucracy more or less satisfied.

Chairman HOYER. Let me introduce—I won't recognize him right this minute for questions but give him a chance to acclimate himself—my colleague on the Commission, from the State of Illinois, Congressman John Porter.

Congressman, we're glad to have you with us.

Mr. Airikyan, if I might ask you, would you explain your specific role in the Nagorno-Karabakh situation?

Mr. AIRIKYAN. I was one of the leaders of our organization, and so I will speak about our organization.

Our main, the main platform of our program was to——

Chairman HOYER. Excuse me. Can everybody hear in the back?

VOICES FROM AUDIENCE. No.

Chairman HOYER. Perhaps if you could move it a little closer.

Mr. AIRIKYAN. [continuing]. was to seek a referendum on national self-determination for Armenia, for independence for Armenia.

And the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis we saw as bringing into life the principle of national self-determination. Hence we supported it.

In October of last year, there was a demonstration to support the demands of the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. And this demonstration in Armenia was broken up.

In February of this year, there were further demonstrations in Armenia in support of the Nagorno-Karabakh people. And the authorities wanted to breakup the demonstration again, but so many people gathered that it proved impossible to disburse.

So the first thing that our organization did was to encourage a lot of people to come to this demonstration.

Our second important action, I believe, was to correct distortions in the Soviet press, in its reporting on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Since we didn't have any means of influencing the Soviet media directly, at considerable risk to ourselves we turned to representatives of the world media, and through them exerted indirect influence.

And so when the people of Armenia, through Voice of America broadcasts, found out that the rest of the world already was informed about their situation—including legal aspects—this did more to inspire and encourage them than many other things.

Also, thanks to world public opinion and the press, we managed to stop the use of repressive measures.

For example, to some degree we foresaw the dangers of situations such as Sumgait. Before Sumgait happened, we called on all Azerbaijans and Armenians to beware of provocations which might arise.

We also appealed to the local authorities, the local Supreme Soviet, that they not fall victim to provocations from Moscow.

It's become very fashionable to talk about Gorbachev as the dissident in the Polit Bureau.

As I mentioned in my statement, we tried to show that everything that happened in Armenia to some extent can be explained by Moscow power politics.

I also have a lot of factual material at my disposal which I will be very happy to make available to anyone who is interested, showing that Moscow was behind the Sumgait incident.

And so they arrested me—I don't think they particularly wanted to—because our organization so accurately characterized the developing situation.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you. I have a number of other questions and we'll come back to those questions if time permits, but we are going to have to end at 12 m. and I want to give both Secretary Lehman and Congressman Porter an opportunity to pose their questions.

Secretary LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very pleased to be here today and very honored to hear the testimony of these very brave witnesses.

I just have a couple of questions. Soviet officials frequently say that you represent a minority of opinion, even among your own nationalities. How would you respond to that question? To that statement?

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Chalidze, why don't we start with you quickly, and we'll try to be brief with our answers with all four. But in light of the fact that you don't have to use an interpreter——

Mr. CHALIDZE. I don't particularly represent any national minorities.

Chairman HOYER. I was going to say that.

Mr. CHALIDZE. Regardless of my Georgian name.

Chairman HOYER. All right. You're the exception.

Mr. AIRIKYAN. Of course, any party, even in a free country, only represents a minority.

But what is important, is if a majority supports your program. That's why we proposed the holding of a referendum.

So it's important what portion of the population actually supports your ideas. Until now, the Soviets have feared a referendum, which I think is its own form of answer to your question.

Mr. RUBAN. For 334 years the Ukrainian nation has been conducting a continuous struggle for its independence. To be freed of the Russian colonialism is the aspiration of all freedom-loving people.

For 70 years of total oppression under the new form of imperial authority the Soviets have stifled the voices of not only Ukrainians but other nationalities of the Soviet system as well.

It is therefore the more conscious element of the Ukrainian community that acts as the voice of conscience for the entire Ukrainian Nation, lest the nationalities of the Soviet system disintegrate.

Each nation or Republic of the U.S.S.R. has its own internal struggles and seeks to express itself freely in the Soviet system.

As we all know, only 3 years ago it was a totalitarian system of total destruction.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. I represent Lithuania but also the other two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia.

Up to a point, I also represent the Soviet Union because the question—until there is a democratic system established—social and economic questions cannot be established and developed till there isn't a democratic system.

Freedom of the word is used before national freedom. The national freedom is the most forbidden today. And therefore, democratic movement in the Soviet Union is locked up under this key.

It is reflected in the field of religion, where discrimination against believers, churches, are closed, converted into warehouses. People are deprived of church services and use of services.

The current demonstrations, the mass demonstrations in Lithuania and the other Baltic countries clearly indicate that the people are striving for national independence and freedom.

Restructuring is taking place, but very slowly. It is now allowed to have the national flag, the tri-color national symbols. But, for instance, the national flag is not allowed to be presented at the Government buildings.

People who have been opposing Stalin and Stalinism, which today is already officially being accepted, and yet people who did that only recently are still being held in camps and in imprisonment.

People who were fighting and acting for human rights, are to this day imprisoned in psychiatric hospitals. They don't admit that keeping people confined in psychiatric hospitals is a crime that that is the correct procedure.

In my case I was confined in a psychiatric hospital for 7 years, and all of that time, neither I, or my wife or children were told the exact reason for my being sentenced.

During those 7 years I met many prisoners who were confined in the psychiatric hospital as punishment.

I am a qualified physician, psychiatrist, and yet I did not meet even one confined patient in the hospital who really had been ill.

I feel the United States, as a democratic country, should put more pressure on the Soviet Union.

I was requested by dissident colleagues in Lithuania, that upon arrival in the United States, I do the utmost I can in the free world, that the Soviet Army be withdrawn from Lithuania.

Chairman HOYER. Could I interrupt the Doctor? If I may, Mr. Secretary, would it be fair to ask the Doctor, that essentially the Secretary's question centers on the testimony that Dr. Statkevicius is giving here today, and the observation he's made, are in fact, reflective of the majority of his fellow Lithuanians, as opposed to, as the Secretary has posited, the Soviets saying that the Doctor's testimony only represents a small minority of the Lithuanian population?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. My answer—Dr. Statkevicius's answer is that while he feels he represents the whole Soviet Union, because while he was confined, he met with many, many people and had opportunity to discuss with them. And he knows their feelings.

That in the Soviet Union there are at least 100 different nationalities who are enslaved, and that should—one had to speak for all of them.

The human rights issue cannot be the main issue only, it has to be the national freedom issue.

In the free independent Lithuania, everyone had their human rights freedom. And once they lost their national freedom, they lost that freedom of human rights also.

And when the country does become again independent, thereby the people will also have all of their rights restored.

Therefore, the main issue is the restoration of independence to the countries.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Secretary?

Secretary LEHMAN. Let me defer to Congressman Porter and pick up on the next round, if that's all right.

Chairman HOYER. Congressman Porter of Illinois.

Congressman PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to the witnesses for not being able to be present for their testimony. And if I'm covering some ground that they've already covered, please tell me.

Dr. Chalidze, can I ask you about Pamiat? How would you describe it, what's the official Soviet attitude towards it, how representative is it of Russian nationalism in general?

Dr. CHALIDZE. How much time do I have?

Chairman HOYER. Well, a few minutes. But I believe you covered that at the conclusion of your statement, about Pamiat being, as I recall——

Mr. CHALIDZE. I mentioned it.

Chairman HOYER [continuing]. an extremist organization. I do want you to speak to it. I don't want to cut it short, but I wanted to call to Congressman Porter's attention that you did address that in the conclusion of your statement, but I'd like you to address it further.

Mr. CHALIDZE. I did mention it in the conclusion, hoping to get a question to talk more.

Congressman PORTER. You've got one.

Mr. CHALIDZE. So, thank you.

Chairman HOYER. This is a setup. I understand. I'll defer.

[Laughter.]

Mr. CHALIDZE. There's a lot of nationalistic sentiment among Russians. They feel that they are an empire nation and there are some commentators who even say it's why Russians tolerate shortages of food and shortages of services, and even generally bad living conditions, because they feel they get something in return to the empire nation to show other people how to live.

I do not particularly agree with that comment, but I'm just mentioning that such comments are made. In any case, there is enough nationalistic feelings and sentiments among Russians.

And during the 70 years of the Soviet era, the nationalistic feeling was rather underground, except sometime during the Stalin area, because Soviet authority and propaganda promoted internationalism, and propagandized national feelings.

So, together with suppressing national traditions of minorities, the Soviets also suppressed national traditions of the Russians, the national religion of Russians, the national history of Russians.

So all this creates frustration. And we can see signs of this frustration among the intelligentsia soon after Stalin's death. And we can see also the extreme wing of this nationalistic sentiment, rather chauvinistic sentiments, including strong anti-Semitics.

I believe the fear that Russian nationalism is—always will be connected with anti-Semitism and chauvinism is not justified. I think that if there will be real freedom of speech in Russia, in 2 or 3 years people will say what they have to say and we would see a very wide spectrum of nationalistic tendencies in Russia.

And only at the extreme end of this spectrum would be people like Pamiat, would be anti-Semitics, would be chauvinists. So now there is a tendency, and I want to urge people against it, there is tendency to judge the national Russian movement by the extremists.

As to the relation between the authorities and Pamiat it is rather interesting. We see in many cases that the authorities even provided room for gatherings of Pamiat. And they would never give room for a gathering of Jews or something like this.

So I have a hypothesis that Gorbachev learned enough of Western political theory, and did understand that it's good to have a political spectrum in the country. And it's good for power to be in the middle of the political spectrum.

So, including Pamiat, he has now, from the left it would be dissents, liberals in the party who want *perestroika* faster than he can deliver, himself in the middle with his people, and on the right it would be party conservatives. And for symmetry with dissidents it would be extreme right, Russian chauvinist Pamiat.

This is just a hypothesis, but it does sound realistic. It's why there was promotion in the press for Pamiat.

They didn't have to talk about it. They didn't write about the demonstration of Jewish refuseniks, but they did write about Pamiat, maybe to demonstrate that there is an extreme right on political spectrum.

At the same time, other people argue: This is what happens if you give complete freedom of speech. So we have to keep *glasnost*, which is limited freedom of speech. Because if we will give complete freedom of speech, extremists like Pamiat will speak out and we will have anti-Semitism.

So there is a big political game around it. But in any case, it's an important event in Russian social life.

And I think there are many Russian nationalists who will gradually understand that it's better to emphasize that they are not touching this extreme right, and they really want to defend the national ecology, national history, and culture.

Congressman PORTER. A question for Mr. Ruban, if I may. The Ukrainian Party Chief, Shcherbytsky still holds power, despite speculation in the West that he would be removed.

How do you account for Shcherbytsky's maintenance of power, although he's seen as a conservative and anti-reform. And how does the average Ukrainian view him?

I guess he'd be on the political spectrum to the right of Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. RUBAN. And what was the last part of how he is perceived——

Congressman PORTER. How does the average Ukrainian view him?

Mr. RUBAN. The present Helsinki Union, whom I represent here——

Chairman HOYER. Could you speak up, Christina?

The TRANSLATOR. I'm sorry?

Chairman HOYER. Could you speak up, into the mike, because I think people are having trouble hearing in the back.

The TRANSLATOR. I'm sorry. Normally my voice carries loud and clear.

Mr. RUBAN. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union which I represent here, believes that this is not an error on Gorbachev's part to keep Shcherbytsky in his post, regardless of the atrocities which he perpetrated against the Ukrainian nation.

This is Gorbachev's tactic. Whether restructuring will proceed or not, the basis of the Soviet imperial system will continue as in the past and it's probably because of this imperialist structure that

they tolerate Shcherbytsky—a person who has demonstrated his ability to keep the elements of national movement in line.

They can make a new "Hong Kong" from the Baltic States, with no fears that it will not dissolve the Soviet Empire.

However, the national democratic movements in Ukraine are perceived as an extremely important impediment and a very dangerous element to the Soviet system.

Therefore, for Russian organizations such as the infamous Pamyat, are given the freedom to meet and speak publicly. When people in national democratic movements attempt to meet peacefully in Ukraine, the militia is called out, beatings take place and attack dogs used to terrorize those gathered.

This exhibits a very clear indication of Soviet imperialist feelings and actions against Ukraine.

Congressman PORTER. Can I ask one more?

Chairman HOYER. One more.

Congressman PORTER. One more.

Dr. Statkevicius, you mentioned—Mr. Ruban mentioned the possibility of a Hong Kong in the Baltic. My understanding is that the economic free zone in Estonia, the plans for that have now been scrapped.

But do you think it's likely that there'll be greater economic, if not political autonomy in the Baltic States?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. I think that the Baltic countries would be able to manage their economic situation just as well as they used to before the occupation when they were free.

So this situation presently——

Congressman PORTER. But are the Soviets going to allow them to have that greater freedom, economic freedom, or is it unlikely?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. Yes. They do recognize, and they would allow more economic freedom, because already they have done so in Estonia.

Congressman PORTER. But are we—is my understanding correct that they were going to have an economic free zone in Estonia and they're not going to have that now?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. The Estonians and Lithuanians are striving for that and they're asking for the economic free zone. And of course that ties in with their political requests, which are in the restructuring movement now, which is reflected in the restructuring movements in both countries, all three countries, for that matter.

Congressman PORTER. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Mr. Airikyan, let me perhaps draw a contrast, and I'd like Dr. Statkevicius to add his thoughts as well.

On the one hand, is Soviet Armenia which has been perceived historically as relatively friendly to Russia, and on the other hand, the Baltic States, historically feeling as you have testified, and as we know full well, that they were arbitrarily and capriciously taken over as a result of a deal between two dictators.

If we assume that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would clearly vote by referendum to be independent states, then once again, Mr. Airikyan do you believe that Soviet Armenia, even at this time,

surrounded by the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iraq would want independence?

Or are they looking for a greater degree of autonomy, as well as the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh question by the incorporation of that area to Armenia?

Mr. AIRIKYAN. I'll try to answer all the parts of your question.

Chairman HOYER. Let me perhaps, give a little additional information. Last April 1987, Speaker Wright led a delegation to the Soviet Union and we had the opportunity of meeting for approximately 2½ hours with General Secretary Gorbachev.

We got into the issue of nationalities and minorities. Some of you perhaps read about the question that he raised about the black minority in the United States.

Gorbachev referred to the autonomy that was given to nationalities within the Soviet Union. The implication was that the problem had been solved by giving representation to them within the Soviet of nationalities.

I'm asking the question in that context, because of course, the perception of the Commission is that autonomy is in name only. That is why, of course, many of the disputes arise.

Excuse me, Mr. Airikyan, you can continue. But I wanted to make that additional observation because this comes from a direct conversation with the General Secretary, in which he believed at that point in time, and this was April 1987, that in fact the nationality problem was being resolved and was accommodated through this structure.

Mr. AIRIKYAN. First, in the traditional relationship between Russia and Armenia, the religious tie was very important, because both were Orthodox Christian nations.

But now, even though Armenia and the Baltic States obviously are in very different geographic positions, nevertheless their general situation has a lot in common.

First of all, the present geographic borders of Soviet Armenia were actually attained by the same method as that used to gain Soviet control over the Baltics, namely by secret agreement, by secret treaty.

Instead of Stalin and Hitler, it was Lenin and Kemal Attaturk who divided up Armenian territory.

And at that time Armenia really did have sympathy for Russia, because it was its one powerful Christian neighbor.

Armenia fears its non-Christian neighbors. Russia knows this, and especially incites this, encourages this.

If Moscow were to allow the holding of a referendum now, in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh episode, yes, undoubtedly the majority of Armenians would vote for independence.

Even though we all know that our future would likely be very difficult, nevertheless we view our current situation as critical.

Literally, a few days ago during a large demonstration, people in the crowd started calling for independence.

And the large exodus from Armenia at present is another way of expressing a desire for independence. Since it can't be achieved on the national level, people at least vote with their feet for their own independence.

As an example of how critical the ecological situation in Armenia has become, I want to mention that over the last 3 years, the average age of mortality has fallen to 47 years.

Chairman HOYER. Let me interrupt, in Soviet Armenia, the live expectancy, the average life expectancy is 47? Is that what I understood you to say?

Mr. AIRIKYAN. Our organization has gone through various cemeteries and counted the average age at which a person has died in Armenia in the last 3 years. And that is 47. This is not an official statistic. Of course, there are no official statistics on this issue.

Chairman HOYER. That's understandable, if that's the statistic, or anywhere the accurate figure, it's understandable why no public official would want to disclose that.

Mr. Secretary, did you have any additional questions?

Secretary LEHMAN. I just thought I would ask each of the witnesses, since coming to the West, How have your views changed? Have you learned new information? Have you come to the conclusion that there are things that you would do differently?

Mr. CHALIDZE. Who will start?

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Chalidze will start, who has been here, I think the longest. Is that correct? Since 1972?

Mr. CHALIDZE. Yes. It's already 16 years.

Chairman HOYER. So you're the expert.

Mr. CHALIDZE. Well, my main views on law and human rights didn't change. But I was pleasantly surprised that there is such a thing like rural America which I enjoy now.

Because when we were talking about America in Russia it did sound pretty industrial to us.

By the way, can I use this moment, and maybe add to something which was said previously?

First of all, I want to express caution about prediction of the result of any referendum. It's a very difficult art, even when it's supported with statistics. It's difficult. Sometimes they are wrong.

But just from looking at one side and predicting the outcome of a referendum is difficult. I don't say that Armenia wouldn't work for independence. I just don't know and I want to caution against any prediction of such a thing.

Another thing is, if there would be a referendum and some national republic would vote for independence, right now I can predict the result. There would be a party or military coup in Russia. Gorbachev, who would allow such a referendum, would lose power. And the republic, that had won independence, would find maybe 10 percent of its population in Siberia camps.

So we are talking about a pretty unrealistic situation, or dangerous situation.

Chairman HOYER. Dr. Statkevicius?

Dr. STATKEVICIUS. It's the fourth month since I've been here in the West. In the Soviet Union a lot has changed since then, since my arrival.

They are allowing many reforms and different economic, social, and also in the religion and cultural field.

But they do not want to recognize, or acknowledge the reform of the basic one of nationalists. The nations demand only one, that they can be their own—they can be their own rulers.

The nations want to be independent and live in the community of other free nations. Not in the Soviet Union alone, but in the European community.

When an—when such an honorable federation will be created and will exist, then we can live in peace.

The nations will be their own independent rulers and then freedom can be assured.

Chairman HOYER. Mr Ruban?

Mr. RUBAN. After arriving in the United States, my thoughts on the happenings within the Soviet system have not changed in essence.

Chairman HOYER. I would point out for the audience, while Christina's talking about exactly what he wanted to say, that it's my understanding that Mr. Ruban has been in the United States since July. So our witness has been here a relatively short time.

Mr. RUBAN. True, in the course of time, however, my views may be broadened.

I think that the United States and the free world should not fear a referendum by the nationalities within the Soviet system. Likewise, having spent many years in Soviet prisons and in exile in Siberia, a large sector of the Ukrainian intelligentsia no longer fears the threat of incarceration or Siberia.

The right of expression for national freedom should be applied in the Soviet Union. The movements taking place for national freedom in the U.S.S.R. are, for the most part, peaceful movements in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere.

Although these movements at times escalate to dangerous confrontational levels, activists and protestors do not willingly submit to authorities.

In fact, the nonviolent methods applied by these activists in nations or republics seeking freedom present a more astute form of a problem requiring a plausible solution to the authorities of the U.S.S.R. totalitarian state.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you. Mr. Airikyan?

Mr. AIRIKYAN. I'd like to say that some of my expectations have changed, but not my views.

I'd like to continue our discussion about referendums. In order to attain the possibility of holding one, one obviously has to have an organization. It's not simply given one from on high.

We have a broad-based organization, and we also have experience that the only way to get anything out of Moscow is through pressure. I mean political pressure, and certainly not any extremist actions.

The source of my information when I made the assertion that a referendum in Armenia on independence would have success is the following: One-half year ago, people said that only 20 percent of the Armenian population would vote in favor of independence. So, this is not an abstract assertion, but rather something founded on comparative data.

I'd also like to ask if one should stop talking about democracy merely because one feels that the results of democratic actions would be non-democratic.

In Armenia there was a strike in which 1 million people took part. But still there was no drastic action in Moscow as a result.

And I don't think a referendum is more terrible than the massive demonstrations that have already occurred.

And particularly since as a result of a referendum, we may lose.

And if we don't insist on democratic change, who will? Certainly not the Communists.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you. I think that probably is an irrefutable assertion.

Let me thank all four witnesses.

I had some other questions, as a matter of fact, I have a number of other questions. But I would like our witnesses, not now, but if they could later at some point, address the following question.

The Commission will be going and Secretary Lehman will be with us as a member of the Commission as well as other members of the Senate and the House to the Soviet Union in November.

That trip is in response to a Soviet suggestion that there be meetings between the Congress and the Supreme Soviet with respect to humanitarian concerns and human rights.

One of the issues that we will raise is the issue that has been the subject of this hearing. If we assume, as I think Mr. Chalidze assumes, that independence as a practical political alternative is not available, I would like all of you to perhaps suggest what positions we could urge upon the Soviets with whom we meet, as steps, nevertheless, moving to that objective.

Hopefully you understood my question.

We share the views, of Soviet Armenia and others who seek self-determination. But I'm asking really for some practical advice to move towards that, that we can urge, as practical steps for the Soviets to take in our meetings with them.

Before I close I want to urge our audience to remain for a video that I think may be of great interest to many of you.

I'm going to leave, because you may have just heard that the House has a vote on. But before I leave I want to introduce somebody who like our four witnesses, and there are others of you in the room who fit this category as well, I know but I'm not able to introduce all of you at this time, has devoted much to the cause of human rights.

Every member of the Commission continues to stand in great respect of those of you who have risked much and have demonstrated great courage in furthering the principles annunciated in the Helsinki Final Act and so many other documents, including of course, from our perception, the Constitution of the United States and our own Declaration of Independence.

But we have with us in the audience, Oksana Meshko. Oksana Meshko [applause] is over 80 years of age. She is a Ukrainian Helsinki monitor.

We on this Commission are particularly in awe of and respectful of those in Communist bloc countries who have shown the courage to join Helsinki monitoring groups.

Ms. Meshko, we welcome you to these hearings and this country. I understand there are other monitors here whose names I may not have. But we welcome you as well and want you to know that the respect of which I speak for Ms. Meshko is for you as well.

We will now have as I said earlier, a screening of a video taken during demonstrations in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Yerevan, Armenia.

These were brought out of the Soviet Union secretly and have never before been seen in their entirety by the Western public.

The footage illustrates the scope and the intensity of the nationality issue facing Secretary Gorbachev.

The Vilnius gathering took place as you know, on July 9, 1988, as a demonstration of support for General Secretary Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika*. The Lithuanian national anthem was sung by over 100,000 voices.

The video from Armenia shows a demonstration on May 28, Armenian Independence Day. Over 100,000 people attended the rally during which speakers called not only for unification of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, but also for an independent parliament.

Again, on behalf of Secretary Lehman and myself, we want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us and again, express our respect for what you have done and are doing today.

I will now adjourn the hearing, but urge all of you who can stay, and unfortunately I cannot, stay and watch the tape.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 12:15 p.m.]

APPENDIX I

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO

OPENING STATEMENT

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

HEARING ON

THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE IN THE SOVIET UNION

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WANT TO BEGIN BY CONGRATULATING YOU AND YOUR DISTINGUISHED CO-CHAIRMAN, SENATOR DECONCINI, FOR SCHEDULING A HEARING ON THE IMPORTANT TOPIC OF THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THIS HEARING GOES TO THE HEART OF THE QUESTION THAT WILL REMAIN THE DRIVING FORCE IN U.S. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE -- WHAT CHANGES CAN WE EXPECT IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO THEM?

TODAY'S PANEL OF EXPERT WITNESSES, INCLUDING PERSONS WITH DIRECT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACTS, CAN PROVIDE US WITH GREAT INSIGHT INTO THIS ISSUE. THEY CAN TELL US ABOUT RUSSIFICATION AND RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, AND ABOUT ITS IMPACT ON UKRAINIANS, ARMENIANS, AND LITHUANIANS.

THIS ISSUE IS CENTRAL TO THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION IS A MULTI-ETHNIC, MULTI-CULTURAL, MULTI-RELIGIOUS EMPIRE. ESSENTIALLY, MORE THAN ONE ETHNIC GROUP IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PREFER TO HAVE ITS OWN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER, THE COMMUNIST

PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE RED ARMY, AND THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY, THE KGB, WON'T ALLOW THESE NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST ASPIRATIONS TO BECOME REALITY.

WHAT IS AT STAKE HERE, IN THE FIRST PLACE, IS THE COURSE AND FUTURE OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMS OF GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA, AND DEMOCRATIZATION. IF NATIONALISM GETS OUT OF HAND IN ARMENIA, IN THE BALTIC STATES, IN UKRAINE, OR IN ANY OTHER PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE ABILITY OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW TO CONTROL THEIR OWN COUNTRY IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. MOST EXPERTS DOUBT THAT THE POLITBURO WILL ALLOW CONDITIONS TO DETERIORATE TO THAT POINT BEFORE THEY ORDER THE KGB AND THE ARMY TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION.

SUCH DECISIVE ACTION WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF WAVES OF ARRESTS, THE RE-INSTITUTION OF TIGHT CONTROL OVER ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, EXPRESSION OF OPINION IN THE MEDIA, PUBLIC ASSEMBLY, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH. POLICE AND SECURITY SURVEILLANCE OF UNOFFICIAL EVENTS, AND SWIFT ACTION TO SUPPRESS THEM, COULD BE EXPECTED.

RESORT TO THE USE OF SOVIET POWER TO OPPRESS DISSIDENT ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS, THEIR LEADERS AND SUPPORTERS, WOULD BE A RESORT TO A MILD FORM OF STALINIST TERROR. THIS ACTION, MOST EXPERTS AGREE, WOULD CUT THE HEART OUT OF GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA.

CLEARLY, NEWS OF THE USE OF FORCE TO SUPPRESS NATIONALIST AND DISSIDENT ACTIVITY COULD NOT BE HIDDEN SO LONG AS GLASNOST REMAINS A REALITY IN ANY PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. EVEN UNDER BREZHNEV, DURING HIS LAST DAYS, NEWS OF EVENTS THE SOVIETS WANTED TO KEEP SECRET WAS DISTRIBUTED THROUGH SOVIET DISSIDENT CIRCLES AND WAS LEAKED TO THE WEST. NOW, AFTER THE EXISTENCE OF GLASNOST FOR SO LONG, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REIMPOSE EFFECTIVE CENSORSHIP AND TIGHT STATE CONTROL OVER ALL INFORMATION.

THE MOST IMPORTANT EFFECT OF A POLITBURO DECISION TO SUPPRESS DISSIDENT AND NATIONALIST ACTIVITY WOULD BE TO KILL WHATEVER HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT GORBACHEV'S POLICIES HAVE GENERATED AMONG THE SOVIET PEOPLE. COMBINED WITH THE INCREASING PHYSICAL HARDSHIP FACING THE SOVIET PEOPLE -- CAUSED BY LACK OF FOOD AND THE POOR QUALITY OF WHAT FOOD IS AVAILABLE, AND BY SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH CONSUMER GOODS -- SUCH A LOSS OF HOPE WILL DOOM SOVIET REFORM TO FAILURE.

SADLY, THIS APPEARS TO BE THE COURSE THAT EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE FOLLOWING. THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAY NOT FIND HIMSELF FACING A PEACEFUL SOVIET UNION IN SEARCH OF DETENTE TO PROVIDE BREATHING ROOM FOR INTERNAL REFORMS. HE MAY FACE A SOVIET UNION EXPERIENCING THE WORST

INTERNAL TURMOIL SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, AND USING TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATE POWER TO CONTROL THIS TURMOIL.

THE CHALLENGE FOR US -- FOR THE HELSINKI COMMISSION, FOR THE CONGRESS, AND FOR THE UNITED STATES -- IS TO PLAN FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT SO WE CAN RESPOND TO IT CALMLY AND WITH CAREFULLY CONSIDERED POLICIES IF IT SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HERE, WE MUST BE CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS GAINS WE HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

OUR PRESENT POSITION IS THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE SO FAR, BUT MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. CLEARLY, THIS ANTICIPATES CONTINUED REFORM.

HOW DO WE REACT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOULD BEGIN ARRESTING LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN ARMENIA, UKRAINE, OR LITHUANIA, FOR ENGAGING IN ILLEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES? WE ARE CLOSE TO THE END OF THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. WHAT SHOULD WE AND OUR ALLIES DO?

VERY IMPORTANT WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION. THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS MANDATE IS CLOSE TO COMPLETION. OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE BEGINNING OF THESE CST NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING ENDS. IN FACT, BOTH VICE PRESIDENT

BUSH AND GOVERNOR DUKAKIS ARE TALKING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

IF THE SOVIETS RESORT TO OPPRESSIVE MEASURES INVOLVING MASSIVE AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS? CLEARLY, IN THE UNITED STATES, POLITICAL LINKAGE STILL EXISTS BETWEEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND THE OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

HOW STRONG IS THAT LINKAGE? IS IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COMPEL A SWIFT AND STERN REACTION BY THIS -- OR THE NEXT -- ADMINISTRATION?

DECISIONS CONCERNING OUR OPTIONS NEED TO BE TAKEN NOW, SO THAT WE ARE NOT CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY SOVIET ACTIONS. NEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION INDICATES THAT DOMESTIC TENSIONS ARE AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL AND CONDITIONS ARE BAD. THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY OCCUR DURING THE MIDST OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. OR THEY MAY AWAIT THE RESULTS OF NEXT YEAR'S HARVEST. IN ANY CASE, WE MUST NOT BE SURPRISED AGAIN BY A RADICAL SOVIET CHANGE OF COURSE, AS WE WERE SURPRISED WHEN GORBACHEV BEGAN THE CURRENT PERIOD OF REFORM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE WITNESSES ABOUT THE LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION THE SOVIET UNION MAY ADOPT IN DEALING WITH THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE.

THANK YOU.

APPENDIX II

STATEMENT OF PETRO RUBAN ON UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ISSUES 9.15.1988

It is my pleasure and priveledge to be a witness before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I am fully aware that my responsibility here is enormous, for I am impelled to testify not only on behalf of those who still remain in the concentration camps and those living in the so called freedom of the Soviet system but also in memory of those who perished in their struggle with the regime - the Ukrainians who died praying to God to grant freedom to their nation.

I would like to recognize the tremendous efforts of the members of this Commission on my behalf and on the behalf of my son Mark. I would like to thank the Chairman of the Commission, Congressman Hoyer, Cochairman, Senator DeConcini as well as their staff, and to extend my gratitude to Ambassador Richard Shifter as well as Ambassador Warren Zimmerman and the Vienna staff for their untiring efforts on behalf of all of us.

With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, humankind has entered into a new era of social relations. Although state interests remain the center of concern, nevertheless HUMAN RIGHTS have at last become an important factor of global politics and international relations. In July of this year, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was created, based on the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which, as you know, has never formally ceased to exist. In its Declaration of Principles the Union reaffirms the principles on human rights put forth by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group on November 9, 1976, but it goes further to say that a national democratic movement for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood will provide the most solid base for guaranteeing the economic, social, cultural and political rights of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union began its activities in defence of human rights and national freedom in the new atmosphere of glasnost and perestroika. However, the difficulties facing a true restructuring of Soviet society are not just due to the inertia of the masses, cowed by many years of terror. The fact is that the opponents of

any real change are a politically cohesive force which is currently on the offensive. They are now focusing on Ukraine, for this remains the fiefdom of Brezhnev's old crony Shcherbytsky, the First Party Secretary in Ukraine. And Gorbachev has not erred by keeping him there, for whether or not "restructuring" succeeds, the Soviet empire must remain intact. This is the general line of the party on the national question, and because of its size and location, Ukraine is of crucial importance to the central authorities of the Soviet Union.

Although not well publicised in the West, the past year has seen numerous public gatherings in Ukraine. Since I don't have time to describe many of them, a chronological list of meetings, numbers attending and issues discussed has been provided. I would like to highlight only a few of those:
May 29 to June 5, the underground Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church organized high masses near Lviv, in Western Ukraine, which were attended by 2,000 people and 5 underground priests to celebrate the Millenium of Christianity;
June 5, the Culturological Club organized an unofficial millenium celebration by 200 people in Kiev, with readings of excerpts from Pope John Paul's homilies, and called for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church;
June 16, 8,000 people gathered in Lviv at a meeting organized by the "Ridna Mova" (Native Language) society. The meeting turned into a debate about the selection of delegates to the 19th party conference, continuing policies of russification, calling for an end to party and KGB priveledges, and for the Soviet republics to be given full autonomy;
June 19, an unofficial millenium celebration was held by 300 people in Kharkiv organized by the unofficial "Vasyl Stus Friends of Ukrainian Language" club where poetry, religious and historic texts were read. The militia attempted to break up the gathering and demanded that it be conducted in Russian and not Ukrainian, its organizer was hreatened with deportation to Chernobil;
July 7, 20,000 demonstrated in Lviv, scheduled to have become regular monthly meetings of the "Democratic Front to Further Perestroika";

July 17, 15,000 Catholics gathered in Zarvanytsia, Ternopil region of Western Ukraine. The militia tried to turn back pilgrims, some of whom came from up to 1000 kilometers away, but they continued on foot, set up camps around the traditional pilgrimage site. Underground Bishop Vasylyk delivered the sermon, over 4,000 people received confession and over 30,000 signatures were collected on a petition calling for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The list goes on, but by far the most significant event took place on June 11-12th when the Ukrainian Democratic Front hosted Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Georgian national rights representatives to form a Coordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR; the Armenians, fully supporting these objectives, were unable to attend. This Coordinating Committee is calling for a "complete political and ecenomic decentralization of the USSR", which they envisaged as a future "confederation of separate sovereign states". (Text appended)

The Ukrainian national-democratic movement is a peaceful one, within the framework of glasnost. Nonetheless, the campaign of slander against the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, The Ukrainian Herald, and the Culturological Club in Kiev, is growing. The authorities heve even begun to spread rumors that the Culturological Club and Ukrainian "nationalists" in general, are preparing pogroms against Jews. In response, Ukrainian and Jewish activists have cooperated in preparing statements protesting this slander. A massive campaign of repression against those active in the national-democratic movement was put into effect in July of this year.

Thousands (in one case, fifty thousand) citizens participated in meetings and demonstrations in Lviv in June and July, the authorities let loose the sixth special regimen militia company (special interior ministry troops authorized by unpublicized decree adopted July 28 by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), trained dogs, the courts and the KGB against these citizens. The state's response to the spontaneous growth of civic activism consisted of arrests, 15-day detentions, compulsory labor, and initiation of criminal cases against

participants. A criminal case has been prepared against Ivan Makar, an activist from Lviv, who was arrested August 4, and charged with Art. 190-3 ("Organization of or active participation in group actions disrupting the peace") - the first case of its kind during the period of restructuring. By arresting him the regime is testing the West's resolve to defend human rights.

What about the future? Workers, peasants, and government officials - all are skeptical about the new promises of the party. There is a basis for this distrust, and it is provided by Gorbachev himself, for he is clearly maneuvering, engaging in disinformation, and contradicting himself. The most contradictory element is Gorbachev's nationality policy.

Among the measures which would be taken if the Helsinki Accords were truly observed in Ukraine, would be the recognition and restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and also the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, together with the return of its confiscated property and the recognition that its forced liquidation in 1946 was a crime.

How will relations between the West and the Soviet Union develop? Will the West support the individuals and their efforts to become true masters of their fate, support the national yearnings of the peoples of the last empire in the world? As a member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, I ask American legislators to take into consideration the fact that the nationalities problem of the republics in the USSR is one of the most serious problems in today's world. The force and timing of Western pressure on the Soviet leaders to exact a certain level of performance on human rights issues is crucial at present.

APPENDIX III

DEVELOPMENTS IN LVIV UNDER PERESTROIKA

6 July 1987
First public meeting called by an unofficial group in 25 years. It took place at the grave of Bohdan Antonych on the 50th anniversary of his death. It was organized by the Evshan Zillia group. Speakers: Iryna and Ihor Kalynets, Yurii Voloshchak, Roman Figol, et al. Attendance: about 150.

4 Octobver 1987
Meeting devoted to the poetry of Bohdan Antonych under the title "A Poet of Youth and Beauty." Organized by the Yevshan Zillia group, it attracted about 1,000 people to Tudor's monument in Lviv. Readers: Ihor and Iryna Kalynets, young poets from Lviv, Ivano-Frankivske, and members of the Ne zhurys' group (Panchyshyn, Taras Chubai, Viktor Morozov, et al) and actors of the Zankovetska theater. It was decided to hold a comemmorative meeting for Antonych each year.

7-14 January 1988
Levy society organized vertep performances and parades during the Christmas season. At one performance under a Christmas tree in the city the attendance was about 5,000.

20 February 1988
On the centennial of the composer V. Barvinsky's birth, about 1,000 people met at his grave. The program was conducted by the Yevshan Zillia group.

21 February 1988
An exhibit of Galician ceramics in the square of the Bernardine Church. It was organized by the Berehynia section of the Levy society. Attendance: about 5,000. The action group of the Shevchenko Native Language Society began its work at this exhibit: it collected signatures in support of the Ukrainian language.

10-24 April 1988
The first hahilky games in the last 35 to 40 years. Organized by the Levy society at the Lviv Open Air Museum, they attracted about 5,000 to each event.

29 May 1988
Children's festival dedicated to the revival of Ukrainian games, oganized by the Levy society at the Lviv Open Air Museum. Attendance: 5,000.

9 June 1988
Meeting at V. Barvinsky's grave on the 25th anniversary of his death. Organized by the Yevshan Zillia group, the program included speeches by Bohdan Horyn, P. Sheremeta and other writers, and K. Stetsenko's panakhyda and Barvinsky's two choral works dedicated to Ukraine's Christianization (1938) sung by the Peter and Paul Church chorus.
Over 1,500 signatures were collected under a petition to build the projected Shevchenko monument on Lenin's Prospect at the center of the city.
It was announced that wreaths will be placed on the grave of the victims of Stalinism on 23 June.

13 June 1988
Inaugurational meeting of the Shevchenko Native Language Society was to have been held at Construction Workers' Building of Culture on Stefanyk Street. Since the building was closed, the crowd moved to the Franko monument. Bohdan Horyn,

P. Sheremeta, and others joined the society. Discussion turned to the illegal denial of entry to the Building of Culture. After the adjournment of the meeting, someone in the crowd suggested a meeting on 16 June to discuss the selection of delegates to the 19th Party Conference in Moscow. The Action Group for Establishing the Shevchenko Native Language Society, which included I. Makar and I. Derkach, was transformed into the Action Group for Conducting Meetings.

16 June 1988
The first political meeting in Lviv. 6,000-8,000 people gathered at the Franko monument. The militia and soldiers at the perimeter of the crowd talked with people and did not interfere in the proceedings. A number of delegates to the Party conference, including the academician Yukhnovsky, Pikhota (chairman of the Municipal Executive Committee) and V. Volkov (first secretary of the city Party Committee) appeared at the Construction Workers' Building of Culture and invited the people to meet them in the building. Since the crowd was too large for the building, the meeting asked the delegates to come to the Franko monument.

The meeting was chaired by I. Makar. V. Chornovil argued that some delegates such as Pohrebniak, Malyk, and Yelchenko were involved in the repressions and the destruction of Ukrainian culture in the 1970s and, therefore, cannot represent the interests of Lviv's inhabitants. M. Horyn claimed that reconstruction and democratization are a sham as long as political prisoners continue to be held in labor camps. B. Horyn stated that the time from 1929 to the 27th Party Congress in 1985 was a counterrevolutionary period, because the soviets lacked any power, and that not only Stalin's rule, but Brezhnev's rule has to be condemned. He demanded also that the constituent republics of the USSR be treated as states, not provinces and that the privileges of Party members be abolished. The crowd applauded these speeches enthusiastically.

The delegates to the Party conference felt uncomfortable facing the people. They could not answer the pointed questions addressed to them. Since no one from the Writers' Union had been chosen to go to Moscow, the meeting proposed that the writers Roman Ivanychuk and Roman Lubkivsky be added to the Lviv delegation to the conference. It was decided that public meetings would be held on the first Thursday of every month at the Franko monument to discuss urgent problems. The present delegates declared that they would be ready to answer the people's questions on 21 June at the Druzhba Stadium, which seats 50,000.

20 June 1988
The second inaugurational meeting of the Shevchenko Native Language Society held at the Construction Workers' Building of Culture. Speakers: Ihor and Iryna Kalynets, Bohdan and Mykhailo Horyn, Viacheslav Chornovil, et al. Attendance 1,000. The inauguration meeting of the Democratic Front for Promoting Reconstruction and the commemoration of the victims of Stalinism were announced.

21 June 1988
The authorities did their best to prevent the meeting from taking place: in the morning many residents found a leaflet from the City Council in their mail box warning them not to attend the meeting, and the two main papers carried articles and letters denouncing the organizers of the meeting as nationalists and agents of the CIA. Also a list of regulations for conducting public meetings was published hurriedly. The Druzhba Stadium was closed "for repairs". Yet, about 30,000 people gathered at the stadium. The authorities attempted to control the meeting, but the official spokesmen were shouted down. The microphone was grabbed from them by different people who addressed the crowd on various

subjects. There was no program or theme for the meeting. Fearing provocation Iryna Kalynets addressed the people asking them to disperse. After 45 minutes the meeting came to an end.

The younger people in the crowd marched from the stadium to the Lenin monument in the city center. There they were met by a line of militia. The demonstration, the first of its kind in Lviv, dispersed without incident.

23 June 1988
A commemoration service for the victims of Stalinism was conducted on their graves at the Lychakivsky Cemetery by two Ukrainian Catholic priests. The service was organized by the Yevshan Zillia group and the Ukrainian Voice. Attendance: over 3,000.

7 July 1988
Inaugurational meeting of the Democratic Front for Promoting Reconstruction called by the Action Group for Conducting Meetings at the Franko monument. Officially approved speakers and their supporters in the crowd tried to take over the meeting and to restrict discussion to the location of the projected Shevchenko monument in Lviv. The authorized speakers opened the meeting before the designated hour. I. Makar, eventually, took control of the meeting. The agents of the authorities tried to shout down the unofficial speakers, but M. Horyn and V. Chornovil managed to speak. The meeting adopted a resolution to locate the Shevchenko monument in the prestigeous Lenin Prospect at the heart of the city. The program of the Democratic Front, a coalition of various unofficial, cultural societies, was read, although the organization failed to be established. Attendance: over 10,000. The Levy society collected 5,000 rubles for a monument to the victims of Stalinism. The next meeting was announced for 4 August.

14 July 1988
The formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Association (a wider organization based on the Ukrainian Helsinki Group) was announced and its "Declaration of Principles" was read at the Franko monument to an audience of about 100.

4 August 1988
As several thousand people gathered in the square around the Franko monument, they were met by the militia and the 16th Detachment of Special Forces. The crowd was pushed back to the 17th of September St. and Mickiewicz St. Some people were beated and dragged to the police vans. Others were attacked by police dogs. The crowd was ordered to disperse, but refused to do so and demanded the release of I. Makar, who had been arrested that morning. The special forces attecked again to shouts of "Shame". The people marched to the city center, to the Lenin
monument, singing patriotic songs. There they were attacked by the 36th Detachment of Special Forces and its dogs. The crowd scattered. Many people, including women and teenagers were beaten up. About 30 were arrested. Anyone with a camera had his film confiscated or exposed.

APPENDIX IV

CONCLUDING STATEMENT ISSUED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR

We, the participants of the council of the representatives of the national democratic movement of the peoples of the USSR which took place in Lviv on June 11 and 12, 1988, on the initiative of the members of the Inter-National Committee in the Defense of Political Prisoners, after carefully considering the news about the situation in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine, and after studying the documents on the national movement in Armenia (whose representatives could not attend this council although they support its goals), we ascertain the inability of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government to deal with the most complex problem of this multi-national country -- the nationalities problem.

As a fateful warning to all peoples who are forcibly annexed to the USSR, and who are hanging their hopes on the new course of the Soviet leadership, we take note of the Soviet government's disregard of the hopes, wishes and desires of the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh and the medieval massacre in Sumhaiti, provoked in essence by the authorities, and the sidestepping by the so-called "Gromyko Commission" of the demands made by the repressed Crimean Tatars who are demanding an organized return to their homeland and the renewal of their statehood. We are deeply disappointed by the so-called election of the candidates to the party conference which was conducted in the Stalin/Brezhnev style. As an aftermath of this, the fate of our people was put in the hands of "the old guard" which is directly responsible for today's deplorable state of affairs in the Soviet Union in general and in our republics in particular.

The conferees of this council - the representatives of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, - support the following demands on the Soviet government made in an appeal on January 12, 1988, issued by the human rights activists of Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine:

* the national languages in the republics should be accorded the status of the official national languages and should be studied by the entire population of a particular republic and should be used in all spheres of the government and community life of a particular republic

* each republic should be accorded national cultural autonomy of the national minorities - including the Russians

* the resettled people should be returned to their homelands and the boundaries between the national republics and oblasts should be redetermined precisely

* the right to develop diplomatic relations with the countries outside of the boundaries of the USSR

* prevention of ecological genocide (ecocide) of our people

* stopping the policy of premeditated homogenizing of the population in conjunction with the centralized planning of the economy.

Having exchanged ideas about the current situation in our six republics, as well as interacting in the national democratic movement, we have concluded that besides the aforementioned, the following questions have become relevant for our peoples:

** the renewal and clear definition of the citizenship of every republic

** restrictions of entry into every republic for permanent residency by the non-native population and, in certain extreme cases (Estonia,Latvia and others), complete stoppage of such entry and even forced resettlement of part of the population

** the guarantee of the full sovereignty of each republic in religious affairs along with the reconstruction of destroyed national churches in some of the republics

** full economic accountability by each republic instead of the discredited centralized economy

** complete investigation into legislation pertaining to labor productivity and the entire penal system in order to eliminate the possibility of utilizing the slave labor of prisoners beyond a republic's boundaries

** the creation within the Soviet Red Army of national military formation with military duty during peacetime served on the territory of one's own republic.

All of these demands are inextricably tied with the complete political and economic decentralization of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics which we envision in the future as a confederation of separate sovereign nations.

We have decided to create a Coordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR for the purpose of sharing the experiences of the national democratic movement and confirming unified action between the consecutive councils (the announcement of its formation is included). One of the duties of the Coordinating Committee will be the specific documented study of all of

the aforementioned demands of each republic. The council has dedicated particular attention to the inconclusive question of Soviet political prisoners and attempts to restore the repressive policies of the past which were manifested in the arrest of the well-known Armenian human rights activist Paruir Airikian on political grounds and the young Estonian patriot Sivert Zholdin. Special efforts will be made in this matter.

The next council of the representatives of the national democratic movements of the poeples of the USSR will take place in September, 1988 in Latvia.

SIGNATORIES:

Merab Kostava - Society of Illa Chavchavadze - Georgia

Iver Zhukovskis from Helsinki 88 - Latvia

Antanas Terleckas and Evhenius Zhukovskis from the National Democratic Movement of Lithuania

Bohdan Horyn, Mykhaylo Horyn, Zinoviy Krasivsky, Oles Serhienko, Pavlo Skochok, Stepan Khmara, Vyacheslav Chornovil from the Ukrainian Helsinki Federation and the Ukrainian Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners

Lahle Parek and Mati Vilu from the Party of the Independent Estonia

Name not given, from the Society of the National Self Determination of Armenia.

APPENDIX V

External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group

P.O. Box 770, Cooper Station, New York, N.Y. 10003

STATUTORY PRINCIPLES OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union has been formed on the basis of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which has existed since 1976. In its activity, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union is governed by the principles declared in such fundamental human rights documents, which have been recognized or ratified by the Government of the USSR, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights and on civil and political rights, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, as well as by the Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which was drafted on the basis of the above legal documents.

While supporting the positive processes of democratization that have been set in motion in the USSR, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union at the same time hopes to broaden and deepen their scope. The Union is critical of the inconsistency and conservatism displayed by the organs of power and the ruling party in resolving various specific issues of restructuring and has taken the position of constructive democratic opposition to the administrative and bureaucratic system that has emerged and become entrenched in the USSR.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union acts on the territory of Ukraine, where it is engaged in defending the political, social, and economic rights of the Ukrainian people and of other nationalities that reside permanently on the territory of the Republic. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union may form groups or organizations outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR in regions densely settled by Ukrainians, as well as among the Ukrainian émigré community, where an External Representation of the Union currently exists.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is structured as a federation of autonomous organizations with broad powers of self-government. Each organization may draft its own Charter, which must take into account these Statutory Principles and the specific nature of the group's activity.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union recommends that the Union's autonomous organizations admit as members citizens of various nationalities sixteen years of age and older, who are essentially in agreement with the Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and who wish to work in their chosen field of human rights defense activity. Disagreement with certain tenets of the Declaration of Principles, provided that its fundamental intent is endorsed, does not preclude membership in the

Union and work in one of its autonomous organizations, with the exception of holding a post in its executive organs.

Membership in the Ukrainian Helsinki Union may be individual or collective. Membership is open to individuals, who may unite in territorial (city, district [*raion*], or oblast [provincial]) organizations, as well as to unofficial (informal) groups (clubs, associations, unions, ethnic minority associations, etc.), who share the fundamental goals of the Union as defined in its Declaration of Principles. Provided this one condition is met, membership in any other organization or party does not constitute grounds for exclusion from membership in the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

The rights and obligations of members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union shall be defined in the charters of local constituent organizations. The only obligation binding all members equally shall be adherence to fundamental democratic principles (the right to elect and be elected to positions of leadership, the right of the minority to publicise a different view or take action, etc.).

As membership in the Ukrainian Helsinki Union grows, oblast Coordinating Councils shall be formed, which will draft the charters of the oblast organizations of the Union, based on the Union's Declaration of Principles and these Statutory Principles. Similar Coordinating Councils shall be formed on territories with dense Ukrainian settlements outside the Ukrainian SSR (for example, a Kuban Council, a Moscow Council, etc.). Collective members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (unofficial clubs and others), which function only within a given oblast, shall delegate their representatives to the respective oblast Coordinating Council, while unofficial organizations that are interoblast or national in scope shall be represented directly in the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council.

The All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council shall consist of representatives of the Union's oblast organizations (one delegate from each such organization), representatives of interoblast (national) unofficial associations (also one delegate from each), all of whom are collective members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and of the leaders of the principal sections of the Union elected at the All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The first All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council formed after the founding of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union shall also include the members of the Initiatory Group of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union who were formerly members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (9 individuals).

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union envisages the formation of the following principal sections within the Union: legislative, safeguarding of human rights, economic, safeguarding of social rights, inter-nationality relations, ecological, issues pertaining

to youth, language, culture and education, Ukrainians throughout the world, and others as the need arises. The number and names of local sections shall be determined by the oblast organizations.

The All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council shall choose from among its members a permanently acting Executive Committee, which shall consists of three executive secretaries and the heads of the various sections.

The All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council shall be elected at a conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union for a term of three years. The Executive Committee elected by the Coordinating Council from among its members shall also serve a three-year term, with the position of chairman to be alternated among the executive secretaries (each serving no longer than a one-year consecutive term). In order to avoid the emergence of authoritarianism in leadership positions, it is recommended that the principle of leadership alternation (not to exceed a three-year term consecutively) also be applied in the oblast coordinating councils and sections.

The All-Ukrainian Conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union shall be convoked no less frequently than once every three years. Should important issues arise, a conference may be convened by a decision of three-quarters of the members of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council.

The function of the coordinating councils, the Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council, and of other elective organs is solely consultative (the gathering of information, transmission of skills and experience, methodological recommendations, etc.). Their decisions are not binding on the members of the Union.

The financial base of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union shall derive from membership dues, which are mandatory, donations, and potential revenues from publishing and other activities. The amount of membership dues and other means of securing and distributing funds shall be determined by the charters of the autonomous organizations of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Each autonomous organization shall turn over 10% of its revenues to the Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council, retaining the remaining 90% to spend at its own discretion.

The principal forms of activity recommended to the autonomous organizations of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union are:

– widespread collection of information in the realm of human rights activity as set forth in the Declaration of Principles and the utilization of this material locally and transmittal of it to the oblast coordinating committees and the Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council;

– the submission of statements in behalf of the oblast and other autonomous organizations and groups of the Union to local and republican governmental organs;

– the submission of statements in behalf of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council and its Executive Committee to the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Ukrainian SSR demanding executive and other kinds of decisions;

– the submission of statements from the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council with the approval of all oblast organizations to the governments of the states that signed the Helsinki Accords in all serious instances in which, despite appeals to the Government of the USSR, violations of fundamental human rights and the rights of the nation continue;

– the submission of similar statements to the international community and the International Helsinki Federation, of which we consider ourselves to be members;

– widespread publicity of the ideas and demands of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union through the mass media (if possible), meetings, assemblies, demonstrations, petitions, leaflets, the independent press, the information agencies and press of the signatory states of the Helsinki Accords, etc. To ensure that the activities and demands of the Union are effectively publicized, the Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union has created a press service, which is operated by the Ukrainian Herald journal.

These statutory principles, like the Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, are in effect temporarily until the founding meeting of the Union, which will take place following the organization of the oblast councils of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Further changes in the statutory principles and in the Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union may be introduced at the conference of the Union or by a unanimous vote of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Committee at the submission of oblast organizations.

The electoral procedure for the Conference of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the conference agenda will be determined at the founding meeting of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

July 7, 1988

APPENDIX VI

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION

1. Preamble

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union as a federation of self-governing human rights defense groups and organizations in the *oblasts* (provinces), *raions* (districts), and cities of Ukraine and outside its borders has been formed on the basis of the Ukrainian Public Group To Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords and affirms its adherence to the human rights principles stated in the Declaration of the Group dated November 9, 1976.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union deems it essential to declare that the fundamental purpose of its activity is the defense of national rights, and, above all, the defense of the right of nations to self-determination as provided for in Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Soviet Union has ratified ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."), because the freedom of the individual cannot be reliably safeguarded in the absence of national freedom. Just as an individual is not merely a means for realizing various ideological concepts, but the ultimate end and crowning glory of creation, so the nation is the sole natural social environment in which an individual can fully develop his abilities and fulfill his purpose on this earth.

As the experience of the past 66 years of Ukraine's membership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has shown, neither the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which has never been a truly sovereign body but only an executive agency of the central government, nor the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is merely a regional subdivision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has had the power or, for the most part, shown any inclination to protect the population of Ukraine from total famine, from the barbaric destruction of the nation's productive forces and intellectual potential, from the denationalization of Ukrainians and the non-Russian minorities, and from artificial changes in the ethnic composition of Ukraine. These facts of outright genocide and the continuing ethnocide of the indigenous population of Ukraine despite today's conditions of relative democratization confirm the indisputable truth that no one party may monopolize the right to decide key issues which pertain to the very existence of a nation. In the absence of organizations that offer alternative or opposing views (in general or on certain issues) to policies pursued by the government and the ruling party, the genuine protection of human and national rights is impossible.

Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is not a political party and its goal is not the take-over of power. The Union has set itself the task of activating the population in all spheres and in devising a mechanism enabling the people to participate in the government of the state and to exercise effective control over the state apparatus.

Although the Ukrainian Helsinki Union supports all the constructive ideas of the government that pertain to the restructuring and democratization of Soviet society, the Union reserves for itself the right of democratic opposition as an effective form of activating democratic processes in society.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is not a political party with a program that is binding on all its members, and it therefore allows a pluralism of views and membership in other political parties and organizations. Instead of a program, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union proposes this "Declaration of Principles," which may form the basis for an alliance of all democratic forces in the struggle to transform our society and safeguard the rights of individuals and of the nation (disagreement with individual principles of this Declaration if its general purpose is endorsed does not preclude participation in the work of any of the sections or local organizations of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union).

2. Fundamental Principles

1. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union contends that the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, which today exists only on paper, would serve as a fundamental and permanent guaranty of securing the economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights of both the Ukrainian people and the national minorities that live on the territory of Ukraine.

2. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union contends that under the guise of a union of sovereign Soviet republics Stalin established a highly centralized authoritarian state, whose nature remains fundamentally unchanged even now. Thus the genuine democratization of Soviet society requires not just individual changes but a radical transformation of the regime. We envisage the future coexistence of the peoples of the USSR in the form of a confederation of independent states, perhaps preceded by a federation of sovereign democratic republics as a transitional stage during which the concept of the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" must possess substantial meaning by virtue of maximum political, economic, and cultural decentralization.

3. While the Ukrainian Helsinki Union will support those legislative changes introduced by the ruling party of the USSR whose democratic nature is not in question,

the Union will at the same time advocate the necessity of repealing in their entirety the anti-democratic and centralistic Stalinist-Brezhnevite constitutions and of drafting a constitution for the USSR and constitutions for the individual republics on a completely new basis.

The new federal constitution of the Soviet Union should guarantee, without the existing discriminatory reservations, only those fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens that are set forth in the international human rights covenants adopted by the United Nations and in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975, all of which the USSR has ratified; it should also define the underlying principles of federative relations between the union republics, but it may not unify and regulate the organization of economic, political, and cultural life in the republics as does the existing Constitution of the USSR.

Instead of all-Union committees, ministries, and other central administrative organs, we propose that only consultative-coordinating agencies be created at the all-Union level and that all power over economic, political, and cultural life be handed over directly to the sovereign republics. In connection with the transfer of all routine legislation to the republican parliaments (supreme soviets), the federal legislative body should be a unicameral parliament (a federal soviet) with equal representation of all union republics irrespective of their population size and administrative-territorial organization. The center of the Union, where all permanently acting federal agencies are located, cannot simultaneously serve as the capital of one of the equal republics, and the sessions of the federal parliament (federal soviet) should be held in the capitals of each of the republics in turn. The new constitution may not contain the imperialistic term "the Soviet people" and, instead, must use the designation "the peoples of the USSR."

4. We propose that the new constitution of Ukraine, which must incorporate both the principles declared in international human rights documents and the experience derived from our people's national and common law, contain an article concerning Ukrainian citizenship, which would grant its holder the right to elect the soviets and be elected to them, as well as the right to work in the state institutions of the Ukrainian Republic. Ukrainian citizenship, which would require compulsory adequate fluency in the official language of the Republic, should also be granted to all persons who lived on any territory of Ukraine before its incorporation in the USSR and their descendants even in one line, returning Ukrainian emigrants from other republics and from outside the USSR, all other persons who have lived permanently on the territory of the

Republic for no less than ten years and who recognize the official language and the Constitution of the Republic.

5. While not imposing any restrictions on noncitizens of Ukraine, with the exception of those specified above, we oppose the artificial resettlement of the population of the Soviet Union for the purpose of changing the ethnic composition of the republics by means of shuffling cadres, centralized planning of industrial construction without taking into account local labor resources, and the like. Although we oppose closed borders like those between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, we nonetheless propose that as a temporary measure, designed to counteract the long-term policy of Russification, permission to enter the Republic to take up permanent residence be linked with obtaining citizenship.

6. We demand the immediate constitutional recognition of the status of the Ukrainian language as the official language of the Republic, accompanied by its obligatory use in all spheres of life in the Republic—in the state and economic apparatus, preschool education, public schools, institutions of higher learning and professional training, military affairs, etc., thereby supporting the nationwide movement encompassing all strata of Ukrainian society that has arisen to demand the enactment of this measure.

7. At the same time, we call for the widest possible guarantees of rights for the national minorities of Ukraine (Russians, Jews, Poles, Byelorussians, and others), for national-cultural autonomy (national associations, schools, theaters, museums, press, churches, and other institutions), and in cases of compact settlements (Hungarians, Greeks, Gagauz, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Russians, and others) also for the creation of national-territorial administrative units in villages, settlements, and districts. We support the immediate restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the framework of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the organized return of the population of this autonomous republic, which had been repressed by Stalin, to its former places of settlement.

8. The activity of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union encompasses territories populated by Ukrainians outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Union demands that the government of the Republic extend its protection to Ukrainian citizens in the Russian SFSR, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia, Moldavia, and other regions, as well as outside the borders of the USSR (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia). Within the borders of the Soviet Union, only the full assurance of the cultural and national needs of Ukrainians residing in the Berestia (Brest-Litovsk), Voronezh, Kuban, and the

Dniester regions of the Moldavian SSR will remove from the agenda the painful issue of the revision of the republic's borders in accordance with the ethnic principle.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will demand a constructive dialogue and broad cooperation at all levels (ranging from governmental to personal contacts) with the Ukrainian émigré community in the West in contrast to the hatred born of Stalinist conditions and fostered by ideological dogmatists.

9. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will raise before the government of the Ukrainian SSR and before the governments of the signatories of the Helsinki Accords the issue of the representation of Ukraine in the international arena as befits its status as a sovereign state, as well as such issues as the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries at the level of embassies and consulates; reciprocal representation of mass media organs, international agencies, firms, and corporations; the separate representation of Ukraine at international scientific and scholarly conferences, in the Olympic Games and world championship sports competitions, at art festivals, and at other international events.

10. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union advocates the transfer of real power in the Republic from the Communist Party to democratically elected soviets [legislatures] of peoples' deputies. Elections to soviets, in which only one candidate is proposed, should be regarded as invalid. This principle must also apply to the president (chairman of the Supreme Soviet) of the Federation and to the president (chairman of the Supreme Soviet) of the Republic, both of whom must be elected by a direct vote for no longer than two consecutive terms. The right to put forward candidates for election to the post of deputy must be granted to all parties, unions, unofficial (informal) associations, and even initiatory groups of citizens who gather in advance a predetermined number of signatures from among the electorate of a given the district (for example, one thousand signatures) in support of their candidate.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union intends to propose its own candidates in the greatest possible number of electoral district during the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the spring of 1989.

11. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union believes that the Ukrainian people must become the sole masters of their natural wealth and resources and build their ties with other republics in the federation and with other countries on the principle of mutual advantage. The national economy of Ukraine must be based on cost accounting and self-financing. All-Union ministries must be liquidated and replaced by coordinating committees with limited functions of negotiation, mediation, and exchange of economic information.

Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

In order to stimulate the economic growth of the Republic, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union regards the maximum encouragement of private initiative as essential. This can be effectuated through the transformation of a portion of state-owned industrial enterprises into joint-stock or cooperative concerns, the voluntary abandonment of collective farms by peasants with allotments of land for private farming or forming various types of cooperatives, and the granting of the right to individuals, cooperatives, or associations to acquire the means of production. The state's intervention in economic life must be confined to providing economic incentives (credits, tax abatements, etc.) and must never take the form of bureaucratized management typical of the command style of administration. A market economy with freely set prices must dominate. Once cost accounting is established in the Republic, the continued buildup of industrial output in economically saturated regions by extensive means will become impossible, and, instead, the republican government, independent of the center, will be able to stimulate the development of economically backward regions with hidden unemployment, thereby preventing any large exodus of population from the Republic, as well as an influx of population from other republics (primarily Russia), deliberately organized by the engineers of centralized economic planning in order to erode the ethnic composition of the population of Ukraine. Industrial enterprises, associations, and cooperatives should have the right to conduct economic relations with foreign enterprises and associations. The inclusion of the material means and economic experience of the Ukrainian émigré community would be beneficial.

12. While safeguarding the socio-economic rights of individuals, the state should guarantee a minimum of material welfare to those who require it (by establishing a "poverty" threshhold, granting unemployment benefits). Charitable activities on the part of civic organizations and private individuals should also be encouraged. But attempts to introduce even relative equality in wages and profits would lead to stagnation and the regression of society.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union contends that the restoration of social justice cannot be attained by economic leveling, which was one of the key causes of the decline of the economy, but by drastically reducing the bureaucratic apparatus (the "new class"), which is a parasite on the national body, and by abolishing all social privileges enjoyed by the party and soviet bureaucratic apparatus (provision of select products and industrial goods, special hospitals, special resorts and recreational areas, personal use of official automobiles, trips abroad at government expense, preferential treatment for

children and relatives in obtaining an education and employment, assignment of better living accomodations out of turn, and so forth).

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will strive for a just social welfare system (pensions for workers and invalids that are no lower than the average wage level in the Republic with supplements to compensate for inflation; equal rights to pensions for citizens in all professions and from all social classes in accordance with age and length of time worked, including members of the armed services, the militia, and the state security organs, and excepting only workers in especially dangerous and harmful occupations; the inclusion of labor performed at enterprises in concentration camps in the work record). The public health system needs to be completely reorganized because it is the cause of a high mortality rate, especially among children, and of decreased life expectancy.

13. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union believes that as a result of the criminal policy of centralization pursued by the all-Union government and the all-Union ministries, which disregarded the interests of the population of Ukraine, the Republic now faces the threat of ecological genocide (ecocide). Not only will the Union strive to ensure a halt in the construction of additional nuclear power plants, but it will demand that already existing nuclear reactors be phased out and replaced with alternative energy sources and that the export of electric power from the territory of Ukraine cease. The Union advocates a review of the structure of Ukrainian industry accompanied by the gradual liquidation of harmful industries (above all, chemical) in industrially saturated regions, a halt in the construction of ecologically hazardous hydrotechnical projects, and wide public discussion of all major industrial projects.

14. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will uphold strict compliance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations covenants, and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference—above all, the universally recognized freedom to express personal views and to disseminate ideas across borders. This is an axiom of democracy which must be safeguarded by the constitutional right to establish independent public organizations, including those in opposition to the government and the ruling party; the right to enjoy proportional access to state-owned mass information media and to establish independent publications provided with the necessary material base; the right to organize meetings, assemblies, and discussions; the right to enjoy free access to all types of information (with the exception of clearly designated military secrets), including archival materials, all regulative statutes, and diplomatic documents now

locked in special funds; and the right to enjoy access to foreign radio broadcasts, books, and periodicals which discuss issues and events from various ideological viewpoints.

15. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union advocates a review of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR and the abrogation of anti-democratic articles in this code: Article 62 ("anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation"), Article 187-1 ("slanderous fabrications" against the state order), and articles that inflict punishment for religious activity, "parasitism," violations of the internal passport regime, and other activities. The Union calls for a sharp reduction of penalties that involve the deprivation of freedom and for the abolishment of the death penalty. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will strive to win the release of all political prisoners, the full rehabilitation of all who were condemned for their beliefs, and the liquidation of special psychiatric hospitals ("psychiatric prisons"). The Committee for State Security, the KGB, will have to be disbanded or reduced in size and reorganized in such a way that it no longer functions as a political police. The judicial system must be reorganized and the "three-man court" replaced by democratic institutions of justice (e.g., trial by jury). The right to a legal defense must be introduced from the moment that charges are lodged. It is essential that the corrective-labor system be humanized. Prisoners must serve their sentences where they committed their crime, and the deportation of prisoners beyond the borders of the republic is inadmissible.

16. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is in favor of reducing the armed forces to reasonable limits, essential for defense, and of reallocating the released funds to the improvement of the people's welfare. Military service should be performed on the territory of the Republic in republican military units. Ultimately military service should become voluntary and remunerated as in some democratic countries.

17. The right to work presupposes the creation of conditions in which this right can be fully implemented. But forcing people to work under threat of conviction is a form of slavery that violates international legal norms. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union advocates the formation of independent trade unions as the most effective means of safeguarding the social rights of the individual (ensuring normal working conditions, just wages, etc.).

18. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union advocates unrestricted rights for believers of various denominations to form their own religious communities, endorses the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Catholic and the restoration of the exterminated Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and calls for the curtailment of persecution of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, Pentecostalists, the followers of Krishna, and other faiths. The Council for Religious Affairs and its local branches,

which have become instruments of repression against believers, must be liquidated. The law must guarantee the right to conduct religious as well as anti-religious propaganda.

19. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union will strive to ensure that the government observes such rights guaranteed by international human rights documents, which the USSR has ratified, as the freedom to choose one's place of residence (by abolishing the passport system and regulated residence permits) and the freedom to enter and leave the Republic, either to other republics in the Union or to any other country.

20. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union believes that all crucial matters that pertain to the interests of the whole population of Ukraine or to a significant portion of this population must be decided by national referendums, preceded by adequate time and opportunity to elucidate the various positions and the freedom to campaign for or against the different issues.

* * *

This Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, as well as the attached Charter of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, was prepared by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group that has existed since 1976 and which hereby resigns its mandate and joins the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

The Declaration of Principles of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and its Charter are in force temporarily until they are ratified at the founding meeting of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which will take place following the organization of oblast councils of the Union. In the future, amendments to the Declaration of Principles and to the Charter will be made by the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union on submissions of the oblast organizations.

July 7, 1988 Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union

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